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Which role do individual income prospects play in the decision to be an entrepreneur rather 
than an employee? In a model of occupational choice, higher expected after-tax earnings 
attract people to self-employment, while more risky net earnings deter risk-averse individuals. 
In this paper I analyse the expected value and variance of income in self-employment and 
dependent employment empirically, accounting for selection. Based on this analysis, 
structural models of self-employment entry and exit under risk are estimated, which include a 
standard risk aversion parameter. The model predicts that the German income tax reduction of 
2000 induced smaller exit rates out of self-employment for men and smaller entry rates for 
women. 
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The factors that induce people to start up or close small entrepreneurial ventures have 
received increasing attention among academics and politicians alike recently. Entrepreneurs 
are agued to introduce new products and new technology, enter new markets and keep the 
market economy innovative, dynamic and competitive. Small firms are also often regarded as 
an engine for the creation of new jobs, which has made entrepreneurship a key topic in 
countries with high unemployment. In Germany, for example, slow economic growth and 
high unemployment have been attributed to the lack of start-ups: “In Germany, too few 
companies are being born. [..] What is lacking are [..] small entrepreneurial start-ups that have 
been the secret of so much development in Britain, America and elsewhere” (The Economist 
2006). Consequently, governments in Germany and elsewhere have implemented various 
policies to promote entrepreneurship. As among the various potential determinants of 
entrepreneurship, taxation is under direct control of the government, tax policy is frequently 
suggested as an instrument to stimulate entrepreneurship. 
The dominating research approach to analyse the impact of income taxation on 
entrepreneurial choice has been the ex-post analysis of certain tax reforms (recent studies 
include Moore 2004; Parker 2003; Bruce 2002; Cullen and Gordon 2002; Georgellis and Wall 
2002; Bruce 2000; Schuetze 2000; Fossen and Steiner 2006; see Schuetze and Bruce 2004 for 
a survey). This branch of research brought about mixed results about the responsiveness of 
entrepreneurial choice to taxation. These ex-post studies are however only of limited 
applicability for the evaluation of future tax reform options ex-ante, as often demanded by 
policy makers. This is a motivation for developing and estimating a structural model of 
entrepreneurial choice. 
Income taxation may influence entrepreneurial choice, which is understood here as the 
decision between dependent employment and self-employment, through its impact on net 
(after-tax) earnings in both alternatives. Thus, to understand the effect of income taxation, it is 
necessary to analyse the influence of net earnings on this decision. In models of 
entrepreneurship as an occupational choice, the probability of choosing self-employment can 
be represented as a function of the differential in expected earnings from self-employment and 
wage employment. Empirical studies analysing this earnings differential include Fraser and 
Greene (2006) and Taylor (1996), who confirmed that higher expected earnings in self-
employment relative to paid employment significantly increase the probability of becoming 
self-employed, Dolton and Makepeace (1990) and Rees and Shah (1986), who also found a 
  1positive, but insignificant effect, and Hamilton (2000), who in contrast concluded that factors 
other than earnings induce people to become self-employed. All these studies only looked at 
gross earnings, however, so they did not consider the impact of taxes. 
Not only preferences of individuals over net returns, but also over risk may play a role in 
entrepreneurial choice, as higher risk associated with income from self-employment may 
deter risk-averse individuals from choosing this option. This idea is related to Kanbur (1982) 
and Khilstrom and Laffont (1979) who modelled entrepreneurial choice as trading off risk and 
returns. They suggested that the less risk-averse become entrepreneurs and may receive a risk 
premium as compensation of the greater variance of their earnings. The historical roots of 
these models are in the work of Knight (1921), according to whom the central role of the 
entrepreneur is to bear risks. Recent empirical works found evidence that risk attitudes play a 
significant role in the decision to become self-employed (Cramer et al. 2002; Caliendo, 
Fossen and Kritikos 2006). 
Taxation alters both the expected value and the variance of net earnings. A progressive 
income tax reduces expected net returns of a risky project such as starting up a business 
(Gentry and Hubbard 2000), but also flattens the stream of net returns over years, which 
reduces the risk associated with self-employment (Domar and Musgrave 1944). The first 
effect may discourage, but the second may encourage an entrepreneurial venture. The overall 
effect of taxation on entrepreneurial choice remains unclear as long as it is not understood to 
what extent both the expected value of net income and the risk associated with it (in terms of 
the variance) influence this choice. 
A structural model is needed to approach this problem. Attempts to estimate a structural 
model of entrepreneurial choice incorporating earnings and risk have been very rare. Rees and 
Shah (1986) formulated a model of the probability of being self-employed assuming a utility 
function with constant relative risk aversion, but used a much simplified model without an 
explicit risk parameter in their empirical estimation. Pfeiffer and Pohlmeier (1992) specified a 
similar model and actually estimated its parameters using the first waves of the German 
Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP waves 1984-1989, limited to West Germany). They only 
considered gross incomes, however, and left out the role of taxation, which is the main 
motivation for this paper. Moreover, mean income and variance curves will be estimated 
individually in this paper, and duration dependence will be controlled for in the transition 
models (see section 3). Rosen and Willen (2002) used the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
and found that in comparison to wage employment, self-employment both comes with an 
increase in mean yearly consumption and an increased variance of returns, which is consistent 
  2with a risk premium for the self-employed. They used the measured level and variance of 
income in the two occupational modes to asses a theoretical model of self-employment 
choice, but came to the conclusion that the risk premium was too large to be rationalized by 
conventional measures of risk aversion. A possible explanation may be that the authors used 
yearly income and did not take into account that the self-employed work more weekly hours 
on average than wage employees. They also only looked at gross incomes and neglected the 
impact of taxes. 
In this paper I develop a structural model of transition probabilities between dependent 
employment and self-employment, which takes into account both expected net earnings and 
net earnings variance in the two alternative employment states. These first and second 
moments of random earnings are estimated empirically for both income from self-
employment and dependent employment, controlling for non-random selection into these 
states. Not only one period’s income, but lifetime income matters for the significant decision 
to enter or exit self-employment. This is taken into account by predicting the curves of future 
expected earnings and earnings variance over each individual’s lifetime conditional on the 
choice to be an entrepreneur or a wage worker. Summary statistics of these predicted curves 
enter the structural transition models, which enables me to estimate the model parameters 
empirically. These parameters include the standard Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk 
aversion, which can be related to results in the existing literature. The estimated model allows 
calculating elasticities of the transition probabilities with respect to the expected value and the 
variance of net income. To illustrate the results, the model is applied to simulate the effects of 
the German Tax Reduction Act 2000 on the self-employment entry and exit rates. 
The structural transition model is developed in section 2 of this paper, and translated into 
empirical discrete time hazard rate models in section 3.1. Section 3.2 briefly introduces the 
data. The methodology for the estimation of gross earnings and their variance, controlling for 
selection, is described in sections 3.3 to 3.5. Sections 3.6 and 3.7 deal with the tax rate 
function and the calculation of annuities. The empirical results are presented in section 4, 
along with the simulation of the tax reform and a sensitivity analysis, and section 5 concludes. 
 
2  The Structural Model 
The model presented here is based on a binary representation of the decision to be self-
employed or dependently employed. In a given period, an individual i makes a rational choice 
  3to be an entrepreneur instead of working in a wage job in the next period if his/her expected 
utility in self-employment (se) is higher than in dependent employment (e): 
E(Use(yi,se)) > E(Ue(yi,e)), 
where yi,se is agent i’s net return from self-employment and yi,e is his/her net return from wage 
work. Both yi,se and yi,e are random variables because future income is risky. Empirically 
earnings of entrepreneurs are significantly more volatile than those of employees with 
comparable characteristics (Heaton and Lucas 2000; Borjas and Bronars 1989). In this model, 
it is assumed that people know the probability distribution of their future income in both 
occupational states. Thus, there is no complete uncertainty, but people do not know the 
realisation of their income in future periods. The expected utility with respect to y is 
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where µy = E(y) and σy
2 = Var(y) and the subscripts of y are suppressed for simplicity. The 
equation demonstrates that E(U(y)) < U(E(y)) if agents are risk-averse (U´´(y)<0).
2  
In the following, I assume constant relative risk aversion (CRRA), as inter alia in Kanbur 
(1982), Rees and Shah (1986), and Pfeiffer and Pohlmeier (1992). This implies that the utility 
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where the constant ρ is the coefficient of CRRA (Pratt 1964). The following random utility 
function satisfies the CRRA condition, yields increasing utility for money y>0, and allows 
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 (3) 
The parameter α >0 reflects the weight of risk adjusted income in the utility function. This 
specification implies risk preference for ρ < 0, risk neutrality for ρ = 0 and risk aversion for 
ρ > 0. The error term εij captures unobservable tastes influencing utility that might be different 
across observations and in the two alternative employment states j∈{se;e} (self-employment 
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2 This general result follows directly from Jensen’s inequality. and dependent employment). These tastes are unobservable for the researcher and thus treated 
as a random variable, but they are known to the individuals in the sample, in contrast to the 
error in future earnings y. Unobserved factors influencing utility in self-employment might 
include the desire to be independent (Taylor 1996) or the believe in the power of one’s own 
actions (Evans and Leighton 1989). The first and second order partial derivations of U with 
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With α >0, the equation reflects that given expected earnings, for risk-averse agents expected 
utility decreases with greater variance of earnings. For risk-neutral agents the variance does 
not matter, and for risk-loving individuals, greater variance actually increases expected utility. 
Taking the expectation with respect to the random earnings variable y did not remove the 
utility error term ε. 
As the agent chooses the employment state which gives him/her the highest utility, the 
probability that agent i decides to be an entrepreneur in the next period is 
Prob(se| yi,se, yi,e, xi)  = Prob(E(Use(yi,se, xi, εi,se) > E(Ue(yi,e, xi, εi,e))  
 =  Prob(εi,e - εi,se < α(V(yi,se) - V(yi,e)) + (βse - βe)´ xi) 
 =  F(α(V(yi,se) - V(yi,e)) + β´xi)   (6) 
































can be interpreted as risk adjusted income.  This random utility model is the basis for the 
empirical transition models that will be outlaid next. 
 
  53  Empirical Methodology 
3.1  Transition Models 
Equation (6) represents a structural model of binary choice between self-employment and 
dependent employment that gives the probability of being self-employed in the next period 
t+1. To avoid the strong assumption that the self-employment probability in period t+1 is the 
same for somebody who is dependently employed in period t and for somebody who is 
already self-employed in t, I condition the model on the current employment state. Thus I 
focus on transitions and estimate separate models of the probability of entering self-
employment conditional on being dependently employed and the probability of switching to 
dependent employment conditional on being self-employed. Moreover, the probability of 
being self-employed not only depends on the current employment state, but the literature has 
also shown that the duration of an individual’s spell in dependent employment significantly 
influences the probability of entering self-employment, and equally the spell duration in self-
employment influences the probability of exit (Evans and Leighton 1989; Taylor 1999; 
Fossen and Steiner 2006). Thus, I additionally condition equation (6) on the duration of the 
current spell in self-employment or dependent employment by including a flexible function of 
the respective spell duration t in the x vector. This function, the baseline hazard, is specified 




i + δ1 ti + δ2 ti
2 + δ3 ti
3.   (8) 
The models are estimated using the maximum likelihood method. In the following, the model 
of transition from dependent employment to self-employment (entry model) is taken as an 
example.
3 The likelihood contribution of an observation i is given by equation (6) if a 
transition occurs between t and t+1, which is now written as 
Prob(transi = 1 | yi,se, yi,e, xi) = F(α(V(yi,se) - V(yi,e)) + β
1´x
1
i + δ ti + δ ti
2 + δ ti
3).   (9) 
If no transition occurs, the likelihood contribution is the complementary probability 
Prob(transi = 0 | yi,se, yi,e, xi) = 1 - Prob(se| yi,se, yi,e, xi) = 1 - F(⋅), (10) 
where transi is a binary indicator variable that equals 1 if a transition is observed, and 0 
otherwise. The log likelihood function for the sample is thus given by 
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3 The model of transition from self-employment to dependent employment (exit model) is specified analogously. 
The only difference is that the coefficient α of the risk-adjusted income differential (defined as the difference 
between self-employment and dependent employment in all models) is expected to be negative in the exit model. 
In the likelihood maximization, α is left unconstrained, so a check if α has the expected sign in all models serves 
as a test for the models’ consistency. ( (
1
ln ln ( ) (1 )ln 1 ( )
=




L trans F trans F ) ) ⋅ . (11) 
Individuals can experience multiple spells in self-employment or dependent employment in 
the observation period. If the person-period observations i are indexed by person, spell 
number and spell duration, the model can be written as a discrete time hazard rate model 
where the hazard rate  
λpk(t) = Prob(t=Tpk | Tpk ≥ t, ypk,se(t), ypk,e(t),e, xpk(t))  
 =  Prob(transpk(t) | ypk,se(t), ypk,e(t),e, xpk(t))   (12) 
is the probability that spell k of person p ends in period t, i.e. a transition occurs, conditional 
on survival until the beginning of t. The discrete non-negative random variable Tik describes 
the duration of the k-th spell of person p; when a spell terminates in period t (measured from 
the beginning of the spell), Tik takes on the value Tik = t. The maximum likelihood method 
allows to consistently take into account not only completed spells, but also both right-
censored and left-censored spells in the estimation. Right-censored spells (where the end of a 
spell is not observed) contribute to the likelihood function through equation (10). For left-
censored spells (spells that had started before the person entered the panel) retrospective 
employment history information in our data make it possible to recover the spell duration t 
correctly and to include these spells consistently in the likelihood function, too (see Fossen 
and Steiner (2006) for a more detailed discussion of this hazard rate model). To complete the 
specification of the likelihood function, F is assumed to be the cumulative logistic probability 
distribution. The implications of alternatively assuming the cumulative normal distribution are 
tested in section 4.4. 
The vector xi controls for observable individual characteristics and covariates that may 
shift taste with respect to self-employment. It includes variables that emerged as important 
determinants of self-employment in prior studies: age, education, work experience, 
unemployment experience, number of children, region, and a constant (for example, see 
Taylor, 1996; Evans and Leighton, 1989; for German data see Georgellis and Wall, 2004; 
Holtz-Eakin and Rosen, 1999). Furthermore, Brown et al. (2006), Parker (2005) and Bruce 
(1999) all find evidence that an individual’s household context has an influence on the 
decision to be self-employed. I account for this by controlling for the marital status, the 
spouse’s employment type, if applicable, and the income of other household members in xi. A 
sensitivity analysis with regard to the chosen control variables is conducted in section 4.4. 
Before the transition models can be estimated by maximising the likelihood function with 
respect to its parameters (the coefficient of the risk adjusted income differential α, the 
  7coefficient of relative risk aversion ρ, the parameters of the baseline hazard δ1, δ2 and δ3 
describing the duration dependence, and the parameter vector of the characteristics 
influencing taste, β
1), the expected value of income µy and its variance σy
2 in the two 
alternative employment states are required for each individual in each period, as these 
statistics enter the likelihood function through V. The strategy for estimating µy and σy
2 is 
described in sections 3.3 and 3.5, after the data basis for this analysis is shortly described in 
the next section. 
3.2  Data 
This analysis is based on the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) provided by the German 
Institute of Economic Research (DIW Berlin). The SOEP is a representative yearly panel 
survey covering detailed information about the socio-economic situation of about 22,000 
individuals living in 12,000 households in Germany. I use all 22 waves currently available 
which cover the years from 1984 to 2005. The SOEP Group (2000) gives a detailed 
description of the data. 
For the purpose of this analysis, the sample is restricted to individuals between 18 and 64 
years of age and excludes farmers, civil servants, and those currently in education, vocational 
training, or military service. The individuals excluded presumably have a limited occupational 
choice set, or they have different determinants of earnings (e.g. subsidies in the case of 
farmers) and of occupational choice that could distort our analysis. Family members working 
for a self-employed relative are also excluded from the dataset because they are not 
entrepreneurs in the sense of running their own business. After removing observations with 
missing values for any of the relevant variables, 117 321 person-year observations are left for 
the analysis. Table A 1 in the appendix shows how these observations are distributed over the 
possible employment states dependent employment, self-employment, and unemployment or 
non-participation, further split by full-time and part-time work (full-time is defined as a 
minimum of 35 hours per week) and gender. Working individuals are classified as self-
employed or dependently employed based on whether they report self-employment or 
dependent employment as their primary activity. A transition can be identified in the data 
when a person is observed in different employment states in two consecutive years t and t+1. 
This paper focuses on the choice between full-time dependent employment and full-time 
self-employment, because the attention is on the comparison of earnings in the two alternative 
employment states, not on the decision to work full-time or part-time or the decision to work 
or not to work. Thus, as in Taylor (1996) and Rees and Shah (1986), the structural transition 
  8models are based on full-time working individuals. I control for possible selectivity effects 
arising from selection into the full-time working categories with a two-step procedure (see 
section 3.4). As a robustness check, the analysis is repeated taking into account transitions 
into part-time dependent employment or self-employment as well (see section 4.4).  
All estimations (except for the tax rate regression) are conducted separately for men and 
for women because of the well documented differences in male and female wage equations, 
and because a separate analysis might help explain why the share of the self-employed is 
much lower among women than among men, at least in Germany. Table A 3 in the appendix 
shows descriptive statistics for full-time self-employed and dependently employed men and 
women in the sample. For a description of the variables used in this analysis, see T .  able A 2
+ u
                                                
3.3  Estimation of Expected Hourly Income 
A key variable in the models of transition between dependent employment and self-
employment developed above is an individual’s expected net income µy. It is understood here 
as expected hourly net income in order to focus attention on the differential in monetary 
compensation for work and not on differences in hours worked (as, for instance, in Hamilton, 
2000, and Taylor, 1996). For each individual µy must be estimated for the two alternatives 
self-employment and wage employment. Therefore, I first estimate separate Mincer-type 
regressions of hourly gross income from dependent employment (using the full-time 
dependently employed) and from self-employment (using the full-time self-employed) on a 
vector of demographic and human capital and work related variables z
earn
i:  
θσ λ ′ =+
gross earn
ij j i j ij ij yz , (13) 
where y
gross
ij are individual i’s hourly gross earnings
4 in employment state j∈{se;e}, θj is the 
coefficient vector, σjλij controls for selection (see section 3.4), and uij is the error term. 
Conceptually, human capital variables clearly determine gross incomes, not net incomes, as 
the latter depend on the tax legislation. Thus, gross incomes are estimated here, and 
estimations of net incomes are derived later (see section 3.6). The variables vector z
earn
i 
includes age, education, the duration of the spell in the current employment state, lifetime 
work and unemployment experience, region, and a constant. Moreover, as predictions of 
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4 Income information for year t is obtained from retrospective questions in wave t+1 about a respondent’s 
average monthly gross income in t, differentiated by income from dependent employment and self-employment. 
Income from self-employment (employment) is only averaged over months in which the respondent was actually 
self-employed (employed), so the information remains accurate if the respondent switched between employment 
states. Incomes are deflated using the Consumer Price Index. Earnings levels rather than log(earnings) are used 
in the regression to avoid excluding people who report zero earnings, which is sometimes observed for the self-
employed during temporary periods (cp. Hamilton 2000). income enter the structural transition models, for identification some variables should be 
included in the earnings, but not in the transition equations. I follow Fraser and Greene 
(2006), Taylor (1996) and Rees and Shah (1986) by including industry dummies, which are 




The estimated income models are then used to obtain individual predictions for gross 
earnings in the two alternative states self-employment and dependent employment, one of 
which is counter-factual, for every individual and period in the sample of the full-time 
working population. If there are unobservable factors that both influence selection into full-
time self-employment or full-time dependent employment and income, it is necessary to 
control for selection.  
3.4  Selection 
A two-step procedure is applied to control for selection effects in the earnings regressions 
(13) (and also in the estimation of earnings variance (18) as will be described in the next 
section). The earnings regressions are the 2
nd step after the estimation of a 1
st step equation of 
selection into the 5 possible employment states spread out in Table A 1: full-time and part-
time self-employment, full-time and part-time dependent employment and 
unemployment/inactivity. The probability of being observed in each of these 5 employment 





















where γj are the coefficient vectors
6 and zi is the vector of regressors. This vector consist of 
the variables z
earn
i used in the earnings regression (13) (excluding spell duration), and for 
identification, it additionally includes variables indicating a self-employed father
7, the number 
of children, and the marital status.
8 After estimation of (14) an individual sample selection 
                                                 
5 Additionally dummy variables for German nationality and physical handicap are added to the earnings 
equations, as these variables turn out to be important for the prediction of earnings. Year dummies are also 
included to account for the business cycle. 
6 γj is normalised to 0 for the base category j=”unemployment/inactivity” 
7 Having a self-employed father is used as an exclusion restriction as this characteristic is likely to have an 
impact on the probability of being self-employed (e.g. Dunn and Holtz-Eakin 2000), e.g. through an inherited 
business, but is not expected to have an influence on earnings after controlling for other relevant factors (cp. 
Taylor 1996). In Germany, self-employed mothers were rare in the generation of most respondents’ parents, so 
only self-employed fathers are used. 
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8 The number of children and marital status are well known to influence the decision to participate in the labour 
market and the choice between part-time and full-time work, especially for women (e.g. Mroz 1987), but are not 
expected to influence gross earnings (cp. Rees and Shah, 1986). term  λij (similar to the “inverse Mill’s ratio”) is calculated for the two states of interest 
j∈{se;e} (full-time self-employment and dependent employment): 
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 , (15) 
where φ and Φ
−1 are the standard normal density function and the inverse of the cumulative 
standard normal density function. Then the term λij enters the earnings equation (13) for 
earnings in employment state j∈{se;e}, which allows to estimate its coefficients σj. For the 
subsequent prediction of an individual’s earnings in each of the two employment states, σjλij 
enters the prediction equation if individual i is actually observed in that state, and in the 
counter-factual case, σjλij,cf enters the equation with 
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. (16) 
For a detailed description of the two-step procedure for polychotomous-choice models and 
selectivity bias see Maddala (1983).  
3.5  Estimation of Earnings Variance 
Along with an individual’s expected income µy, the first moment of random earnings, the 
individual variance of earnings σy
2, i.e. the second moment, is also required to estimate the 
transition models between dependent employment and self-employment. The literature on the 
earnings differential has mostly analysed the first moment only, and if the second moment is 
taken into account, as in Pfeiffer and Pohlmeier (1992) and in Rosen and Willen (2002), the 
variance is usually modelled as a population parameter and not estimated on an individual 
basis, which implies the assumption that income is homoscedastic. This assumption is relaxed 
here, allowing the variance of earnings to differ not only between self-employment and 
dependent employment, but also with individual characteristics and covariates.
9 The point 
made in this paper is that individuals do not only worry about the first, but also the second 
moment of their individual  probability distribution of income in the two alternative 
employment states when they consider a transition.  
As the error term in the earnings equation (13) uij has an expected value of 0, the 
variance of gross random earnings conditional on the explanatory variables is 
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9 Therefore, heteroscedasticity robust (White) standard errors are reported in the earnings regression (13). 2 () ( σ ==
gross gross
yi j Var y E u
2 ) i j
+ e
. (17) 
Thus, the squared residuals from the earnings regression can be used to specify a flexible 
heteroscedasticity function and estimate σ
gross
y
2. The natural logarithm of the squared 
residuals are regressed on the explanatory variables of the earnings model  z
earn
i and the 
selection term λij from (15) to control for selection, separately for the two employment states 
j∈{se;e}: 
2 ˆ ln( ) πσ λ ′ =+
earn var
ij j i j ij ij uz , (18) 
where eij is the error term. Taking the logarithm of the squared residuals is the common 
approach to ensure that predicted values for the variance are strictly positive.
10 For the 
prediction of the variance in the counter-factual employment state, λij is replaced by λij,cf from 
(16) as in the earnings regression. This procedure yields individual predictions of the variance 
of gross earnings, which is the basis for the calculation of the variance of net earnings, as will 
be described in the next section. 
3.6  Estimation of the Tax Function 
As individual utility depends on net (after-tax) income, the relevant variables in the structural 
transition models are the expected value and the variance of net income. To derive net income 
from gross income, the German progressive income tax schedule must be approximated. As 
the SOEP provides information about both a respondent’s gross and net income,
11 individual 











                                                
, (19) 
where grossinci and netinci are gross and net income per year. These tax rates τi, are regressed 
on a vector z
tax
i of variables relevant for the tax code: 
τκ ′ =+
tax
ii z , (20) 
where  κ is the coefficient vector and vi is the error term capturing specifics of the tax 
legislation which cannot be taken into account in this approximation.
12 The vector z
tax
i 
includes polynomials of the first, second and third degree of gross yearly income to model the 
 
10 To obtain consistent predictions for the squared residuals, the predicted values from the log model must be 
exponentiated and multiplied with the expected value of exp(eij). A consistent estimator for the expected value of 
exp(eij) is obtained from a regression of the squared residuals on the exponentiated predicted values from the log 
model through the origin. This procedure does not require normality of eij  (see Wooldridge 2003). 
11 Respondents are asked to state their gross and net income in the week before the interview. 
  12
12 All working respondents, no matter if full-time or part-time, provide information that is used to estimate this 
tax function. non-linear nature of the tax function, a “married” dummy, additionally interacted with a 
“female” dummy (to account for the effect of income splitting), the number of children, a 
“disabled” dummy, and a “self-employed” dummy (to allow for differential tax treatment). 
After this tax function is estimated, it can be used to predict average tax rates dependent on 
the predicted gross incomes in both the true and the counter-factual employment state and 
individual characteristics.
13 This allows deriving the expected value and variance of net 
incomes in both alternatives. 
3.7  Calculation of Annuities 
In the model developed above, agents considering a transition between the two employment 
states dependent employment and self-employment compare the expected value µy and the 
variance σy
2 of net income in the two alternatives. Rational agents will not only take into 
account next year’s returns when they consider a decision as important as starting or giving up 
a self-employed venture, they will rather take into account the future curves of expected 
income and income variance over the remaining years of their economic activity; the horizon 
is assumed to be reached at 65 years (the retirement age in Germany). Thus, equations (13), 
(18) and (20) are used to predict the expected net income and net income variance for each 
individual in each of the two alternative employment states for all years until the individual 
reaches the age of 65 by adjusting the duration in the respective employment state within the 






















where  q is the real interest rate plus one
14, and ni is the number of remaining years of 
economic activity for individual i. The difference between net income derived from actual 
gross income and net income derived from predicted net income in an individual’s actual 
employment state ji in the year of observation is added to y
net
ij,k for j=ji, as this residual 
contains additional information about an individual’s productivity in state ji. An annuity of 
income variance is calculated analogously. These annuities finally enter the utility function 
and thus the structural transition model (9). 
 
                                                 
13 Predicted y
gross
ij are hourly incomes, whereas the tax function requires yearly income. For the conversion, the 
average number of hours worked in the sample of full-time working people is used. 
  13
14 The real interest rate is assumed to be 5%. The sensitivity with respect to q is tested in section 4.4. 4  Empirical Results 
4.1  Expected Value and Variance of Earnings 
The reduced form multinomial logit equation of selection into the different employment states 
(14) is estimated first.   reports the estimated marginal effects of the variables on the 
probabilities of the outcomes “full-time self-employment” and “full-time dependent 
employment” for men and women.
15 The significant marginal effects of fatherse indicate that 
the probability of being full-time self-employed is 7.2 percentage points higher for men with a 
self-employed father and 0.8 %-points for women. The higher probability confirms results 
found in the literature (e.g. Dunn and Holtz-Eakin 2000; Taylor 1996). A child significantly 
reduces the probability of being full-time dependently employed (21.9 %-points for women, 
but only 1.8  %-points for men); the probability of being full-time self-employed is not 
affected as much, it decreases for women whereas for men it even increases. Married men and 
women have a lower probability of being full-time self-employed, whereas the effect for 
dependent employment differs strongly between genders: Married women have an 18.8 %-
points lower probability of working full-time in dependent-employment, whereas men have a 
13.8 %-points higher probability. 
Table 1
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Now the selectivity terms λij can be calculated using (15), and the 2
nd step earnings equation 
(13) can be estimated. The results from the earnings regressions are shown in  . 
Unemployment experience has a significant negative effect on earnings in dependent 
employment and even more so in self-employment for both men and women. A university 
degree strongly increases earnings for men, especially in self-employment. For women, the 
positive effect is smaller in both employment states, and it is insignificant in self-employment. 
The duration of the spell in the current employment state has a positive and significant 
influence on earnings for self-employed and dependently employed men and for dependently 
employed women (the income curves over time will be discussed in detail below). The 
coefficient of the selectivity term λ is negative in all models, which indicates that the error 
terms in the selection equation (14) and the earnings equation (13) are negatively correlated. 
It is significant in the models of dependent employment only. Insignificant and sometimes 
Table 2
                                                 
  14
15 The multinomial logit coefficients and the marginal effects for the outcome categories “part-time self-
employment” and “part-time dependent employment” are available upon request. negative selection terms in regressions of earnings from self-employment are often reported in 
the literature (Brock and Evans 1986; Rees and Shah 1986; Evans and Leighton 1989; Dolton 
and Makepeace 1990; and Borjas and Bronars 1989), suggesting that there is no significant 
selection on unobservables; Taylor (1996), in contrast, reports positive and significant 
selection effects. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Table 3 shows the estimation results of the earnings variance equation (18). For both 
employment states and genders, the explanatory variables are jointly significant at 
conventional significance levels, which confirms the hypothesis that earnings are 
heteroscedastic (Breusch-Pagan test). This result shows that the variance of earnings not only 
differs between dependent employment and self-employment, but also between individuals, 
dependent on their characteristics and covariates. The coefficient of the selectivity term λ is 
significant and positive in dependent employment, which indicates a positive correlation 
between the error terms in the selection and the variance equations, and insignificant in self-
employment, like in the earnings regression. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Using the estimated earnings and earnings variance equations, the individual expected value 
and variance of gross earnings in both dependent employment and self-employment can be 
predicted. Before net earnings and the corresponding variance can be calculated, which are 
needed for the structural transition models, the tax rate function (20) must be estimated. The 
results of this estimation are given in Table 4. They show that the individual average tax rate 
increases with gross income at diminishing rates, which reflects the progressive income tax 
code in Germany. The coefficient of the self-employment dummy indicates that the average 
tax rate of the self-employed is roughly 3.4 percentage points lower than the rate of their 
dependently employed counterparts (see Fossen and Steiner (2006) for details on the 
differential tax treatment of the self-employed). 
 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
  15As argued in section 3.7, not only the income in the next year, but in all future years of 
economic activity are relevant for an individual considering a transition from dependent 
employment to self-employment or vice versa. The predicted gross and net hourly income 
curves over the duration of a spell in self-employment or dependent employment are plotted 
for self-employed men and women in  , and for dependently employed men and 
women in   (at mean values of the other explanatory variables). The net income curves 
run below the corresponding gross income curves (the gap is the tax paid), and they are also 
flatter, which reflects the progressive income taxation in Germany. In each diagram, the 
income curves in the actual employment state and in the counter-factual employment state can 
be directly compared. For reference, the scatter dots mark the mean gross hourly incomes of 
people actually observed with the respective spell duration. The numbers at the dots indicate 




 shows that on average, self-employed men would initially earn higher hourly 
gross income in dependent employment than in self-employment, but self-employment is 
rewarded higher for them after about 15 years. Interestingly, net income is higher for them in 
self-employment almost from the beginning on. This finding supports the hypothesis that 
higher net earnings in self-employment induce the self-employed to choose this state. The 
picture is similar for self-employed women, although women have to endure a considerable 
period of slightly lower net earnings in self-employment before these exceed the counter-
factual wages from dependent employment. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Dependently employed people would on average earn more if they were self-employed, both 
in gross and in net terms, as Figure 2 shows. On its own, this finding could be interpreted as a 
sign that earnings do not play a role in the choice of the employment state, or even of 
irrational behaviour. The structural model developed in this paper offers a different 
explanation, however: If employees do not only have a higher expected value of earnings in 
the counter-factual state of self-employment, but also a higher variance of earnings, it may be 
rational for them to choose dependent employment if they are risk-averse. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
  16Figure 3 and   shed light on the variance of earnings in the two different employment 
states. For better comparability, the variation coefficient (the standard deviation over the 
mean) is plotted. Again, the curves are drawn by varying the spell duration and keeping the 
explanatory variables fixed at their mean values, and the scatter dots indicate the actual mean 
variation coefficients of earnings at the respective spell durations. The four diagrams show 
that the variation coefficient is larger in self-employment for all groups, i.e. for actually self-
employed and dependently employed men and women, and both before and after tax. The 
difference between the earnings variation in self-employment and dependent employment is 
more pronounced for those actually dependently employed than for those actually self-
employed. Thus, switching to self-employment would require the dependently employed to 
tolerate a much higher earnings risk, and risk aversion could explain why employees do not 
switch to self-employment in spite of the higher expected value of earnings. 
Figure 4
 
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
4.2  Estimation Results of the Transition Models 
After the individual net earnings and net variance profiles over time (till the age of 65) are 
summarised as annuities (see section 3.7), the structural models of transition probabilities 
between the alternative employment states dependent employment and self-employment (9) 
can be estimated. Table 5 shows the coefficients resulting from the likelihood maximisation 
and the marginal effects in brackets where applicable. For each gender, the model of entry 
into self-employment from dependent employment is shown in the left and the model of exit 
from self-employment towards dependent employment in the right column. A positive sign of 
a coefficient indicates that the corresponding variable increases the probability of a transition 
to the alternative employment state, and the marginal effects show by how many percentage 
points. A university degree, for example, increases the probability of entering self-
employment ceteris paribus by 0.26 percentage points for dependently employed men. 
The estimates for the structural parameters ρ and α are given at the bottom of the table. 
The coefficient of the risk adjusted differential between net income from self-employment 
and from dependent employment α is significant in all models and positive in the models of 
entry into self-employment and negative in the models of exit. The four models thus 
  17consistently confirm the hypothesis that a higher risk adjusted net income in self-employment 
in comparison to dependent employment induces people both to become and to remain self-
employed as the probability of entry is increased and the probability of exit is decreased. 
The coefficient of constant relative risk aversion ρ is positive in all models, indicating 
risk aversion, and significant except for self-employed women, for whom the null hypothesis 
of risk neutrality cannot be rejected. The estimated degrees of risk aversion are low for self-
employed men, moderate for dependently employed men and high for dependently employed 
women and lie in the range reported by the literature (e.g. Holt and Laury 2002; Binswanger 
1980). Considering that far more women are dependently employed than self-employed, this 
finding is also in line with Dohmen et al. (2005), who found that women are generally more 
risk-averse than men. Self-employed men and women are clearly less risk-averse than 
employees, which is consistent with the hypothesis that risk aversion deters people from 
choosing self-employment. The finding that self-employed women may even be risk-neutral, 
and thus less risk-averse than self-employed men, could be explained by the low share of the 
self-employed among women in Germany, which may imply that only the least risk-averse 
women choose self-employment. 
 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
Table 6 reports point elasticities of the transition probabilities with respect to the expected 
value µy and the variance σy of net income in self-employment and in dependent employment. 
They were calculated by evaluating the estimated structural transition model at the mean 
values of the independent variables. All elasticities are significant except for the variance 
elasticities of the probability of exit from self-employment for women. All elasticities have 
the expected sign, indicating that higher net earnings in self-employment in comparison to 
dependent employment attract people to this state, whereas higher relative variance deters 
people from choosing this option. For example, the leftmost column shows that a 1 % rise in 
the annuity of expected hourly net income in self-employment increases the probability of 
entering self-employment by 1.4 % if the variance and the income in dependent employment 
do not change. Similarly, a 1 % drop in net wages also raises the probability of entry into self-
employment by 1.15 % if the prospects in self-employment are unchanged. The elasticities do 
not equal in absolute terms because of the different mean variance in the two employment 
states. If the annuity of the net hourly income variance in self-employment increases by 1 %, 
  18the probability of entry decreases by 0.16 %, and analogously, a 1 % rise in the variance of 
wages increases the probability of entry by 0.05 %. 
 
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
 
4.3  Illustration: Effect of the German Tax Reform 2000 
To illustrate the results given in the previous section, in the following the estimated model is 
used to simulate the ex-ante effects of the German Tax Reduction Act 2000 
(Steuersenkungsgesetz 2000) on the transition rates between self-employment and dependent 
employment. This reform significantly reduced income tax rates in several steps between 
2001 and 2005. The top marginal income tax rate dropped from 51 % in 2000 to 42 % in 2005 
and the lowest marginal tax rate from 22.9 % to 15 %. Haan and Steiner (2005) calculated the 
relative change of net income due to the reform by income deciles using microsimulation 
analysis. I draw on these results to calculate the net income individuals would have received 
in 2000 if the full reform had already been in effect in that year. This allows comparing the 
transition rates predicted by the model in the reform scenario with those in the baseline 
scenario (using pre-reform net incomes in 2000); the difference in the transition rates is the 
predicted response to the reform.
16 For the 5337 individuals observed in 2000, the post-reform 
expected values and variances of net incomes are calculated for both alternatives self-
employment and dependent employment and all future years, and lifetime annuities enter the 
transition models in the same way as in the baseline scenario.   reports the simulation 
results. Due to the tax reform, for men the predicted exit rate out of self-employment drops by 
almost 2 %-points, whereas the entry rate remains nearly unchanged. For women, the exit rate 
virtually does not react to the tax reform, but the entry rate falls by 0.3 %-points. Altogether, 
the tax reform promoted male self-employment and discouraged female self-employment. 
This finding can be explained by the gender differences in tastes for risk and returns 
expressed by ρ and α. On the one hand, the positive net income differential between self-
employment and dependent employment increases on average due to the tax reform, which 
makes self-employment more attractive. On the other hand, the reform makes the tax schedule 
less progressive, so the extent to which the high variance of earnings from self-employment is 
Table 7
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16 Income information for the year 2005 is not available in the SOEP yet, so the simulation cannot be performed 
after the full implementation of the reform. levelled through taxation decreases. This discourages the more risk-averse dependently 
employed women from entering self-employment. 
 
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
 
4.4  Sensitivity Analysis 
A number of assumptions were made in this paper in order to take the structural model 
developed in section 2 to the data. This section assesses the sensitivity of the results with 
respect to these assumptions.   shows the structural parameters α and ρ and their robust 
standard errors resulting from different specifications of the models. The baseline estimation 
results are given in the first rows for reference. Overall, the estimated parameters are similar 
in the different specifications and the basic results are thus found to be robust.
17 When instead 
of annuities over the individually remaining economically active years only the expected 
value and variance of net income in the next year are used in the transition models, large 
standard errors result and the structural coefficients in the transition models for men become 
insignificant. As argued in section 3.7, it seems unlikely that agents only look at next year’s 
income prospects when making a decision as important as a transition between dependent 
employment and self-employment, and it would be irrational; thus, this special estimation 
may not be very informative. 
Table 8
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5  Conclusion 
The results of the analysis conducted in this paper show that not only the expected value, but 
also the variance of an individual’s future after-tax income play a role in the choice between 
self-employment and dependent employment. The probabilities of entry into self-employment 
and also of exit are in general found to be significantly elastic with respect to both the first 
and the second moments of net income in the two alternative employment states, and the 
elasticities have the expected signs: Higher expected earnings in self-employment relative to 
dependent employment attract people to become and to remain entrepreneurs, whereas higher 
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17 The probit coefficient of the risk adjusted income differential α can be multiplied by 1.6 for a rough 
comparison with the logit coefficient (Amemiya 1981). variance discourages them from choosing this option. This can also be inferred from the 
estimated coefficient of relative risk aversion which indicates that agents are moderately risk-
averse. Women’s higher risk aversion in comparison to men could be an explanation for the 
low share of female entrepreneurs in Germany. The finding that entrepreneurial choice is at 
least in part determined by a trade-off between returns and risks - in the sense of Kanbur 
(1982) and Khilstrom and Laffont (1979) - is further supported by the empirical analysis of 
incomes in dependent employment and self-employment. The estimated curves show that 
controlling for selection, both the expected value and the variation coefficient of hourly net 
earnings are on average higher in self-employment than in wage work in Germany, at least 
after the initial years have passed.  
The estimated structural models of self-employment entry and exit are relevant for policy 
makers wishing to estimate the effect of changes to the progressive income tax code on self-
employment. An income tax reform generally influences both the mean of net income 
(through the change in the individual average tax rate) and the variance of net income 
(through the change in the progressiveness of the tax code). The effect of a reform on the 
transition rates between dependent employment and self-employment can be simulated ex-
ante using the estimated structural transition models. This is especially interesting if the tax 
reform is explicitly intended to promote the creation and survival of small businesses. The 
model predicts that the German Tax Reduction Act of 2000 reduced the exit rates out of self-
employment for men and the entry rates for women, which in effect promoted male self-
employment and discouraged female self-employment. 
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Table 1: Multinomial Logit Estimation of Employment State Probabilities 
Variable  Marginal Effect on Outcome Probability 
(Robust Standard Error) 
 Men  Women 








highschool 0.0057  -0.0303  0.0069  0.0258 
  (0.0026)*  (0.0057)*** (0.0014)*** (0.0072)*** 
apprenticeship -0.0037  0.0864  -0.0027  0.0956 
 (0.0022)  (0.0042)***  (0.0010)**  (0.0056)*** 
highertechncol  0.0147 0.0546 0.0044 0.0927 
  (0.0028)*** (0.0040)*** (0.0013)*** (0.0072)*** 
university  0.0005 0.0761 0.0115 0.2503 
  (0.0027)  (0.0043)*** (0.0019)*** (0.0094)*** 
age_bgn 0.0120  -0.0002  0.0014  -0.0062 
 (0.0010)***  (0.0016)  (0.0004)***  (0.0022)** 
age_bgn_sq  -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0000 -0.0003 
  (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** 
workexp_bgn  -0.0001  0.0082 0.0017 0.0261 
  (0.0005)  (0.0009)*** (0.0002)*** (0.0011)*** 
workexp_bgn_sq  -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0002 
  (0.0000)*  (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** 
unemexp  -0.0140 -0.0576 -0.0054 -0.1013 
  (0.0013)*** (0.0025)*** (0.0009)*** (0.0035)*** 
unemexp_sq  0.0005 0.0034 0.0001 0.0058 
 (0.0001)***  (0.0003)***  (0.0002)  (0.0004)*** 
german  -0.0005  0.0551 0.0017 -0.0121 
 (0.0037)  (0.0070)***  (0.0020)  (0.0096) 
disabled  -0.0208 -0.0655 -0.0098 0.0057 
  (0.0025)*** (0.0076)*** (0.0011)*** (0.0102) 
nchild  0.0046  -0.0175 -0.0034 -0.2187 
  (0.0008)*** (0.0017)*** (0.0006)*** (0.0031)*** 
married -0.0117 0.1383  -0.0055 -0.1883 
  (0.0022)*** (0.0047)*** (0.0012)*** (0.0057)*** 
fatherse 0.0721  -0.0960 0.0083  0.0270 
  (0.0048)*** (0.0071)*** (0.0019)*** (0.0081)*** 
Fed. state dummies  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Year  dummies  YES YES YES YES 
constant  YES YES YES YES 
LR χ
2  21190.336   33341.201  
Pseudo R
2 0.252    0.224   
N 54157    63164   
The table shows the marginal effects on the probabilities of the outcome categories “full-time self-employment” 
and “full-time dependent employment”. For dummy variables, the change in the probability caused by a discrete 
change from 0 to 1 are reported. The categories “part-time self-employment” and “part-time dependent 
employment” are not shown for brevity. The base category is “unemployment / inactivity”. Stars (* / ** / ***) 
indicate significance at the 5% / 1% / 0.1% level. Source: SOEP 1984-2005. 
 
  25Table 2: Regression of Hourly Gross Earnings 
Variable Coefficient 
(Robust Standard Error) 
 Men  Women 




duration  0.594 0.315 -0.305  0.358 
 (0.196)**  (0.024)***  (0.378)  (0.023)*** 
dur_sq -0.021 -0.005 0.039  -0.013 
 (0.014)  (0.002)**  (0.033)  (0.002)*** 
dur_cu  0.000 0.000 -0.001  0.000 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000)*** 
highschool -1.236  2.058  0.774  2.118 
 (0.938)  (0.123)***  (1.170)  (0.087)*** 
apprenticeship -1.715  0.166  -1.941  0.627 
 (1.075)  (0.087)  (1.209)  (0.072)*** 
highertechncol -3.561  1.110  -2.020  0.726 
  (1.066)*** (0.107)*** (1.096)  (0.108)*** 
university  6.652 3.888 1.303 2.634 
  (0.990)*** (0.147)*** (1.383)  (0.106)*** 
age_bgn  0.367 0.179 0.216 0.095 
 (0.361)  (0.041)***  (0.397)  (0.036)** 
age_bgn_sq -0.004  0.001  -0.004  -0.001 
 (0.005)  (0.001)*  (0.005)  (0.001) 
workexp_bgn 0.176  -0.111  -0.067  0.074 
 (0.120)  (0.019)***  (0.283)  (0.016)*** 
workexp_bgn_sq  -0.001 -0.002 0.004  -0.002 
 (0.004)  (0.001)***  (0.006)  (0.001)** 
unemexp  -1.819 -1.418 -2.993 -0.877 
  (0.484)*** (0.059)*** (0.887)*** (0.075)*** 
unemexp_sq  0.105 0.103 0.449 0.069 
 (0.053)*  (0.008)***  (0.226)*  (0.016)*** 
german -2.060  0.589  4.115  0.824 
 (1.185)  (0.094)***  (1.812)*  (0.091)*** 
disabled 0.095  -1.015  -2.987  -0.466 
 (1.195)  (0.116)***  (2.765)  (0.135)*** 
Fed. state dummies  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Year  dummies  YES YES YES YES 
Industry  dummies  YES YES YES YES 
λ  -1.966 -0.642 -2.082 -0.407 
 (1.475)  (0.230)**  (3.789)  (0.093)*** 
constant  7.217 5.523 -1.275  4.833 
 (9.361)  (0.704)***  (15.583)  (0.542)*** 
R
2  0.186 0.370 0.285 0.313 
N 3075  41365  991  22076 
Stars (* / ** / ***) indicate significance at the 5% / 1% / 0.1% level. Source: Full-time self-employed and 
dependently employed individuals in the SOEP 1984-2005. 
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Variable Coefficient 
(Robust Standard Error) 
 Men  Women 




duration_se  -0.033 -0.019 -0.073 0.011 
 (0.033)  (0.009)*  (0.071)  (0.013) 
dur_se_sq  0.004 0.003 0.005 0.002 
 (0.002)  (0.001)***  (0.006)  (0.001) 
dur_se_cu  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000)  (0.000)***  (0.000)  (0.000) 
highschool -0.093  0.269  0.177  0.347 
 (0.137)  (0.039)***  (0.296)  (0.046)*** 
apprenticeship  -0.162 -0.031 -0.368 -0.041 
 (0.122)  (0.034)  (0.217)  (0.042) 
highertechncol -0.306  0.209  -0.225  0.129 
 (0.145)*  (0.039)***  (0.219)  (0.049)** 
university  0.672 0.512 0.126 0.523 
  (0.134)*** (0.046)*** (0.267)  (0.053)*** 
age_bgn -0.011  0.037  -0.051  0.028 
 (0.054)  (0.014)**  (0.079)  (0.017) 
age_bgn_sq  0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
workexp_bgn 0.008  -0.012  0.004  0.020 
 (0.019)  (0.007)  (0.046)  (0.009)* 
workexp_bgn_sq 0.000  -0.001  0.000  -0.000 
 (0.001)  (0.000)**  (0.001)  (0.000) 
unemexp  -0.244 -0.245 -0.098 -0.262 
 (0.102)*  (0.026)***  (0.174)  (0.032)*** 
unemexp_sq  0.025 0.014 0.057 0.017 
 (0.008)**  (0.003)***  (0.025)*  (0.005)*** 
german -0.723  0.199  -0.978  0.239 
  (0.180)*** (0.044)*** (0.345)**  (0.064)*** 
disabled 0.069  -0.051  -0.218  0.037 
 (0.309)  (0.049)  (0.537)  (0.077) 
Fed. state dummies  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Year  dummies  YES YES YES YES 
Industry  dummies  YES YES YES YES 
λ  -0.366 0.502  -0.451 0.298 
 (0.210)  (0.092)***  (0.556)  (0.049)*** 
constant 4.391  -0.359  3.654  -0.656 
 (1.336)**  (0.232)  (2.432)  (0.292)* 
R
2  0.115 0.075 0.162 0.068 
N 3075  41365  991  22076 
Stars (* / ** / ***) indicate significance at the 5% / 1% / 0.1% level. Source: Full-time self-employed and 
dependently employed individuals in the SOEP 1984-2005. 
 
  27Table 4: Regression of Average Tax Rates 
Variable Coefficient 

















year dummies  YES 
constant 0.241 
 (0.003)*** 




Stars (***) indicate significance at the 0.1% level. Source: Self-employed 
and dependently employed individuals in the SOEP 1984-2005.  
 
  28Table 5: Maximum Likelihood Estimation Results of Structural Transition Probabilities 
Variable /  
Structural Parameter 
Coefficient / Estimated Value 
[Marginal Effect] 
 Men  Women 








duration  -0.2880*** -0.4066*** -0.3531*** 0.0987 
  [-0.0001] [-0.0015] [-0.0000] [-0.0022] 
dur_sq  0.0144*** 0.0190*** 0.0227**  -0.0110 
dur_cu  -0.0003** -0.0002** -0.0004** 0.0002 
highschool 0.0538  -0.3701  0.4431*  0.0367 
 [0.0001]  [-0.0027]  [0.0003]  [0.0021] 
apprenticeship  0.6198*** 0.9552*** -0.1486  -0.2523 
  [0.0012] [0.0081] [-0.0001]  [-0.0136] 
highertechncol 1.0088***  0.7288**  0.2981  -0.5878 
  [0.0043] [0.0004] [0.0002] [-0.0089] 
university 0.6693***  -0.1735  0.0837  -1.0398*** 
 [0.0026]  [-0.0001]  [0.0001]  [-0.0157] 
age_bgn 0.0166  -0.1965***  0.0384  -0.0930 
 [0.0000]  [-0.0015]  [0.0000]  [-0.0052] 
age_bgn_sq -0.0010  0.0018**  -0.0008  0.0005 
workexp_bgn  0.0165 0.0007 0.0224 -0.0013 
  [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [-0.0001] 
unemexp 0.0544  -0.0877  0.1293  0.0173 
 [0.0001]  [-0.0007]  [0.0001]  [0.0010] 
nchild  0.0664 0.0470 -0.0054  -0.3061* 
  [0.0001] [0.0004] [-0.0000]  [-0.0170] 
east  0.1622 0.1353 0.4067 0.7306* 
  [0.0003] [0.0011] [0.0003] [0.0446] 
north  -0.0900 -0.3605 -0.0967 -0.4851 
  [-0.0002] [-0.0025] [-0.0001] [-0.0231] 
south -0.3366**  -0.1873  0.0756  -0.2832 
  [-0.0006] [-0.0014] [0.0000]  [-0.0147] 
otherhhinc  0.0010 0.0019 -0.0149**  0.0014 
  [0.0000] [0.0000] [-0.0000]  [0.0001] 
spouse_empl 0.2986*  -0.0356  -0.1093  -0.3820 
 [0.0007]  [-0.0003]  [-0.0001]  [-0.0196] 
spouse_selfempl  0.6352 0.1035 1.6111***  0.9153*** 
  [0.0018] [0.0008] [0.0023] [0.0677] 
spouse_notempl  0.1831 0.3229 0.0109  
  [0.0004] [0.0028] [0.0000]  
constant -4.5106***  1.9661  -5.1964***  -0.5233 
ρ  0.3901*** 0.1673*** 1.2878*** 0.0394 
α  0.2625*** -0.2338***  0.1378*** -0.3742*** 
Wald χ
2  140.904 132.002 81.822  38.394 
log likelihood  -1579.163  -522.770  -611.151  -198.612 
transitions  (N)  388 232 133 78 
transitions  (rate)  0.009 0.075 0.006 0.083 
N 41365  3075  22076  945 
For self-employed women in our data, an unemployed/not working husband predicted a negative outcome (no 
transition) perfectly, so the 46 corresponding observations and the variable spouse_notempl were excluded from 
this estimation. Stars (* / ** / ***) indicate significance at the 10% / 5% / 1% level, based on heteroscedasticity 
robust standard errors. Source: Full-time self-employed and dependently employed individuals in the SOEP 
1984-2005. 
 
  29Table 6: Elasticities of Transition Probabilities with Respect to After-Tax µy and σy  
Elasticity  Variable: Annuity of... 
(Robust Standard Error) 
 Men  Women 








1.4359 -2.4640  1.4816 -2.7238  Hourly net earnings from self-
employment  (0.2501)*** (0.4600)***  (0.6664)**  (0.7734)*** 
-1.1513 1.7619  -0.0848 2.6966  Hourly net earnings from 
dependent employment  (0.2065)*** (0.4641)***  (0.0512)*  (0.8283)*** 
-0.1584 0.5169  -0.6209 0.0526  Variance of hourly net earnings 
from self-employment  (0.0127)*** (0.0386)***  (0.3287)*  (0.0408) 
0.0472 -0.0043  0.0041 -0.0030  Variance of hourly net earnings 
from dependent employment   (0.0035)*** (0.0003)***  (0.0019)**  (0.0023) 
The elasticities give the percentage change of the transition probabilities induced by a discrete one percent change 
in the annuities of expected value or variance of income from one of the two employment types, evaluated at the 
mean values of the explanatory variables in the sample. Stars (* / ** / ***) indicate significance at the 10% / 5% / 
1% level. Source: Full-time self-employed and dependently employed individuals in the SOEP 1984-2005. 
 
Table 7: Predicted Transition Rates in 2000 with and without Tax Reduction Act 2000 
   Predicted Transition Rate in % 
 Men  Women 








transition  rate  2000 1.105 6.303 0.744 8.909 
      
transition rate 2000 if full tax 
reform had been in effect already 
1.110 4.340 0.440 8.923 
difference (effect of tax reform)  0.005  -1.963  -0.304  0.015 
N 3301  242  1722  72 
All rates reported are significant at the 1% level. Source: Full-time self-employed and dependently employed 
individuals in the SOEP 1984-2005. 




(Robust Standard Error) 
 Men  Women 









ρ  0.390 0.167 1.288 0.039 
  (0.051)*** (0.050)*** (0.229)*** (0.040) 
α 0.263  -0.234  0.138  -0.374 
  (0.022)*** (0.034)*** (0.025)*** (0.084)*** 
Exclusion of other household income 
ρ  0.390 0.168 1.287 0.039 
  (0.051)*** (0.050)*** (0.219)*** (0.040) 
α 0.262  -0.233  0.136  -0.374 
  (0.022)*** (0.034)*** (0.023)*** (0.084)*** 
Exclusion of number of children, other household income and spouse’s employment state 
ρ  0.394 0.167 1.213 0.042 
  (0.052)*** (0.050)*** (0.240)*** (0.040) 
α 0.261  -0.233  0.146  -0.367 
  (0.022)*** (0.034)*** (0.027)*** (0.082)*** 
Exclusion of unemployment experience 
ρ  0.390 0.168 1.302 0.040 
  (0.051)*** (0.050)*** (0.225)*** (0.039) 
α 0.262  -0.234  0.135  -0.374 
  (0.022)*** (0.034)*** (0.024)*** (0.083)*** 
Baseline hazard is a polynomial of forth degree 
ρ  0.390 0.166 1.284 0.039 
  (0.051)*** (0.050)*** (0.224)*** (0.040) 
α 0.262  -0.234  0.139  -0.374 
  (0.022)*** (0.034)*** (0.024)*** (0.084)*** 
Probit specification of the hazard rate 
ρ 0.480    1.225  0.081 
 (0.055)***  did  not  (0.192)***  (0.051) 
α 0.107  converge  0.068  -0.164 
 (0.009)***   (0.010)***  (0.034)*** 
Transitions to part-time self-employment / dependent  empl. counted as positive outcome 
ρ  0.389 0.175 1.233 0.068 
  (0.048)*** (0.051)*** (0.199)*** (0.043) 
α 0.270  -0.236  0.152  -0.362 
  (0.021)*** (0.033)*** (0.024)*** (0.073)*** 
Real interest rate 8% (q=1.08) 
ρ  0.428 0.175 1.256 0.043 
  (0.061)*** (0.046)*** (0.221)*** (0.040) 
α 0.237  -0.221  0.136  -0.364 
  (0.022)*** (0.031)*** (0.024)*** (0.083)*** 
Real interest rate 2% (q=1.02) 
ρ  0.364 0.157 1.319 0.039 
  (0.045)*** (0.056)*** (0.246)*** (0.040) 
α 0.288  -0.248  0.140  -0.386 
  (0.022)*** (0.038)*** (0.026)*** (0.084)*** 
Consideration of next year’s expected  income only instead of lifetime annuity 
ρ  -0.489 -0.073 2.242  0.049 
 (0.701)  (0.240)  (0.630)***  (0.101) 
α  -0.008 -0.037 0.116  -0.310 
 (0.022)  (0.051)  (0.135)  (0.075)*** 
Combined estimation for men and women (including dummy variable for female) 
ρ  0.477 0.123    
  (0.050)*** (0.033)***    
α 0.242  -0.256     
  (0.017)*** (0.031)***    
Stars (* / ** / ***) indicate significance at the 10% / 5% / 1% level. Source: Full-time self-employed and 
dependently employed individuals in the SOEP 1984-2005. 
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Figure 2: Predicted Hourly Earnings of Employees (Euros) 
3876
3820
3427 3009 2736 2309
2085 1823 1651 1521 1430 1309 1245
















0 10 20 30 40
Spell Duration (years)
Gross Self-Empl. Earnings Gross Wage
Net Self-Empl. Earnings Net Wage
Observed Means of Gross Self-Empl. Earnings
Number of Observations Respective Tenure
Dependently Employed Men
2703
2622 2248 1873 1597 1336 1157 963 845 754 663 619 555 505 454 337 297 272 246 232 216 155 148 135 138 119
















0 10 20 30 40
Spell Duration (years)
Gross Self-Empl. Earnings Gross Wage
Net Self-Empl. Earnings Net Wage
Observed Means of Gross Self-Empl. Earnings
Number of Observations Respective Tenure
Dependently Employed Women
 










































0 10 20 30 40
Spell Duration (years)
Gross Self-Empl. Earnings Gross Wages
Net Self-Empl. Earnings Net Wages
Observed Means of Gross Self-Empl. Earn. Var. Coeff.






































0 10 20 30 40
Spell Duration (years)
Gross Self-Empl. Earnings Gross Wages
Net Self-Empl. Earnings Net Wages
Observed Means of Gross Self-Empl. Earn. Var. Coeff.
Number of Observations Respective Tenure
Self-Employed Women
 


























0 10 20 30 40
Spell Duration (years)
Gross Self-Empl. Earnings Gross Wages
Net Self-Empl. Earnings Net Wages
Observed Means of Gross Self-Empl. Earn. Var. Coeff.





























0 10 20 30 40
Spell Duration (years)
Gross Self-Empl. Earnings Gross Wages
Net Self-Empl. Earnings Net Wages
Observed Means of Gross Self-Empl. Earn. Var. Coeff.
Number of Observations Respective Tenure
Dependently Employed Women
 
  33Appendix 
 
Table A 1: Number of Person-Year Observations in the Different Employment States 
Employment State Category  Men  Women 
Unemployed/inactive 7976  26244 
Full-time employed  41365  22076 
Part-time employed  1460  13089 
Full-time self-employed  3075  991 
Part-time self-employed  281  764 
Total 54157  63164 
Source: SOEP 1984-2005.     
 
Table A 2: Definition of Variables 
Variable Definition 
duration  Duration of current spell (self-employment or employment). For left-censored spells, the 
duration since the last job change is reported, which may be shorter than the overall 
duration in the current employment state if somebody switched jobs within one of these 
states before entering the panel 
dur_sq, dur_cu  Square and cube of duration variable 
highschool  Dummy for individuals who have a high school degree ("Fachhochschulreife" or 
"Abitur") 
apprenticeship  Dummy for individuals who finished an apprenticeship ("Lehre") 
highertechnical  Dummy for individuals who finished a higher technichal college or similar 
("Berufsschule", "Schule Gesundheitswesen", "Fachschule", "Meister", 
"Beamtenausbildung", or "Sonstige Ausbildung") 
university  Dummy for individuals who have a university degree 
age_bgn  Age at the beginning of the current spell in self-employment or dependent employment 
workexp_bgn Years  of  work  experience at the beginning of the current spell 
unemexp  Years of unemployement experience 
nchild  Number of children under 17 in the household 
east  Dummy for individuals who live in one of the 5 new eastern federal states or East Berlin 
north  Dummy for individuals who live in one of the northern federal states (Schleswig Holstein, 
Lower Saxony, Hamburg, or Bremen) 
south  Dummy for individuals who live in one of the southern federal states (Baden-
Wuerttemberg or Bavaria) 
female Dummy  for  women 
otherhhinc  Income of other individuals living in the same household per year (in € 1000) 
married  Dummy for married individuals 
spouse_empl  Dummy for married individuals whose spouse is dependently employed and living in the 
same household 
spouse_selfempl  Dummy for married individuals whose spouse is self-employed and living in the same 
household 
spouse_notempl  Dummy for married individuals whose spouse is unemployed or inactive and living in the 
same household 
german  Dummy for individuals with German nationality 
disabled  Dummy for handicapped / physically challenged individuals 
fatherse  Dummy for individuals whose father is/was self-employed 
grossinc_yr  Gross income per year (€ 10 000) 
self-employed  Dummy for self-employed individuals 
x_sq indicates the square and x_cu the cube of variable x. Dummy variables are equal to one if the condition 
holds and zero otherwise.  
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Table A 3: Descriptive Statistics 
Self-Employed 
   Men  Women 
Variable  Unit  Mean Std Deviation Mean  Std Deviation
duration   years  7.641 7.589 6.226  6.392
highschool binary  0.349 0.306 
apprenticeship binary  0.434 0.364 
highertechncol binary  0.292 0.287 
university binary  0.306 0.341 
age_bgn years  36.838 9.204 38.532  9.567
workexp_bgn years  13.581 9.680 13.911  9.352
unemexp years  0.312 0.805 0.363  0.798
nchild number  0.824 1.009 0.592  0.840
east binary  0.228 0.386 
north binary  0.155 0.127 
south binary  0.264 0.210 
otherhhinc (yr)  € 1000  12.328 30.524 15.907  20.437
married binary  0.724 0.719 
spouse_empl binary  0.319 0.237 
spouse_selfempl binary  0.074 0.154 
spouse_notempl binary  0.127 0.046 
german binary  0.945 0.964 
disabled binary  0.035 0.015 
fatherse binary  0.209 0.145 
transitions (N)    232 78 
transitions (rate)    0.075 0.079 
N   3075 991 
Dependently Employed 
   Men  Women 
Variable  Unit  Mean Std Deviation Mean  Std Deviation
duration years  9.915 8.559 8.110  7.611
highschool binary  0.215 0.200 
apprenticeship binary  0.565 0.529 
highertechncol binary  0.205 0.210 
university binary  0.182 0.202 
age_bgn years  31.043 9.402 30.692  9.284
workexp_bgn years  9.271 9.209 8.374  8.393
unemexp years  0.390 0.965 0.371  0.866
nchild number  0.779 0.992 0.387  0.696
east binary  0.244 0.358 
north binary  0.127 0.116 
south binary  0.286 0.243 
otherhhinc (yr)  € 1000  12.682 20.808 16.209  20.368
married binary  0.700 0.531 
spouse_empl binary  0.283 0.264 
spouse_selfempl binary  0.017 0.034 
spouse_notempl binary  0.180 0.039 
german binary  0.911 0.935 
disabled binary  0.054 0.046 
fatherse binary  0.066 0.082 
transitions (N)    388 133 
transitions (rate)    0.009 0.006 
N   41365 22076 
Standard deviations are given for continuous variables only. Source: Full-time self-employed and dependently 
employed individuals in the SOEP 1984-2005. 
 